We present a possible computational content of the negative translation of classical analysis with the Axiom of Choice. Our interpretation seems computationally more direct than the one based on G odel's Dialectica interpretation 10, 1 8 ]. Interestingly, t h i s i n terpretation uses a re nement of the realizibility semantics of the absurdity proposition, which i s not interpreted as the empty type here. We a l s o s h o w h o w to compute witnesses from proofs in classical analysis, and how to interpret the axiom of Dependent Choice and Spector's Double Negation Shift.
Introduction
It is well-known that the Axiom of Choice 15] is validated by t h e Brouwer{Heyting{Kolmogoro explanation of the logical constants 3]. In view of the negative i n terpretation of classical arithmetic into intuitionistic arithmetic 6], one would expect that it is possible to make constructive sense of the Axiom of Choice as used in informal mathematics, for instance in the use of Zorn's Lemma, or in establishing the existence of a well-ordering on the reals. This, however, appears to be non-trivial. The combination of the Axiom of Choice and the Excluded Middle turns out to be extremely problematic from a constructive point of view. To make constructive sense of such a combination can actually be seen as one the main aims of Hilbert's programme 8, 9] . We address here the more modest question of the analysis of the computational content of the Axiom of Choice, by giving a novel realizability interpretation of the negative translation of the Axiom of Choice.
Our paper is organized as follows. After a presentation of the formal system under consideration, we enumerate some known di culties in combining the Axiom of Choice and the Excluded Middle. They appear in quite di erent forms in di erent formalisms: as a non-conservativity result, as the impossibility of a recursive realization, and as a problem with a formulation in sequent calculus. The central and longer part is then a description of a possible realizability i n terpretation, with a precise and detailed proof of correctness. This proof of correctness is non-constructive. ( We use an intuitionistic meta-theory throughout this paper, unless explicitely stated otherwise.) We show next that this interpretation can begeneralized to the case of the axiom of Dependent Choice, and in this case, reduce intuitionistically its correctness to a principle of bar induction. We also give an interpretation of the Double Negation Shift and try a comparison with Spector's bar recursive i n terpretation of DNS 18, 10, 11] , which suggests a computational content of the negative interpretation of Axiom of Choice based on G odel's Dialectica translation. We e n d b y an heuristic explanation of our realizability interpretation, based on a game-theoretical analysis of proofs.
Theory
The theory HA ! , i n tuitionistic higher-order arithmetic, is built up from three parts: (i) axioms and rules for rst order many-sorted intuitionistic predicate logic (ii) equality axioms and the axiom schema of induction (iii) lambda calculus axioms and rules and the de ning equations of the constants R , R xy0 = x, R xy(sz) = yz(R xyz). Thus our theory HA ! essentially coincides with (schematic in formula ). Here we will mainly consider AC(N ) (schematic in ), that we may abbreviate to AC. The axiom AC is su ciently strong to formalize a large part of classical analysis. Intuitionistically, AC is not a strong axiom, as may beexpected from the Brouwer{Heyting{ Kolmogorov interpretation of a 89 pre x. More formally, it follows from results of Goodman 7] that adding AC(N N) a n d AC(N N!N) t o HA ! is conservative o ver Heyting Arithmetic.
A negative interpretation
We will use the notation r for :: : This notation is justi ed by the fact that :: can be thought of as a modal operator on formulae we can prove indeed that r follows from and r from r and ) r :
Since absurdity is not interpreted by the empty type, we cannot realize ?) for all . We overcome this problem by exercising some care in the negative i n terpretation. The idea is essentially due to Kolmogorov 13] . We employ t h e fact that ?) r can be proved for all without using the axiom schema ?) . Although our prime formulae are decidable, the negative interpretation of a prime formula will be r .
As negative interpretation we use a standard version of the double negation translation, i.e.
pre xing prime formulae and 9 by r. The negative i n terpretation of a formula , denoted by G , By the stability 1 of formulae after the negative i n terpretation, which follows from Lemma 1.1 (iv), G A C is subsumed by the following axiom schema:
8x : N r 9 y : : (x y)] ) r 9 f : N! 8x : N : (x f x) 1 A formula is stable i it is equivalent to the negation of another formula.
Par abus de langage we will from now on denote this schema by G A C.
We can now extend the preservation property above to: if is provable in classical analysis, then G is provable in negative analysis. The proof goes by inspection of the standard preservation proof, taking care that ?) is avoided using the lemma above.
Classical Logic and the Axiom of Choice
In this section, we e n umerate some known di culties in giving a constructive i n terpretation of the Axiom of Choice in the presence of classical logic. The main remark is that G A C fails to bean intuitionistic consequence of the Axiom of Choice 2 . We point out three independent reasons: G A C makes problematic the constructive i n terpretation of the notion of function actually, i t refutes Church's Thesis G A C is proof theoretically very strong, we can actually interpret by G A C impredicative second-order comprehension, so that one cannot give a n y predicative i n terpretation of G A C a standard computational interpretation of classical arithmetic, the one using in nitary propositional calculus 17, 21] , when extended to quanti cation over functions, fails to interpret the Axiom of Choice.
G AC refutes Church's Thesis
In the classical system HA ! c +AC we m a y de ne the characteristic function of any predicate. Indeed, for any statement (x) we h a ve 9f 8x (x) () If we take for some non-decidable formula, then we may prove in this way the existence of non-recursive functions in HA ! c + AC: In other words, we refute in HA ! c + AC the formula CT This simple remark has some deep consequences. Since CT is a formula not containing ), it implies its negative translation G C T by lemma 1.1 (vi). We can thus prove ? in the system HA ! ; + G A C + CT: In other words, if we assume G A C we can prove i n HA ! ; that not all functions are recursive (even though we cannot exhibit a counterexample!).
A direct corollary is that there cannot be any recursive realization 12, 24] of G A C: For exactly this reason, and because the semantics of the system NuPrl is based on recursive realizability, the work 16, 4] restricts itself to a fragment of classical logic that does not include the Axiom of Choice. 2 This is to be contrasted with the induction schema over integers, whose negative i n terpretation is an instance of the induction schema itself.
This often forces one to encode functions as relations, and this encoding may be unnatural (see the discussion of Higman's lemma in 16]).
It is interesting to analyse in what way our interpretation avoids this di culty. The main obstacle for recursive realizability is the equivalence between the realizability o f and the realizability of r which comes from the fact that the absurd proposition has no realizers. Our interpretation introduces potential \realizers" for the absurd proposition, and because of this, r can be realizable though is not realizable. What is hard to understand intuitively is why taking into account possible \absurd situations" (that will actually never happen) has such an e ect.
Proof Theoretic Strength of G A C
A second di culty in interpreting G A C comes from the fact that in intuitionistic logic, G A C is proof-theoretically much stronger than AC: We h a ve seen already that HA ! + AC is conservative o ver HA 7] . In contrast, by using the fact that in HA ! c + AC we may de ne the characteristic function of any predicate, it is not di cult to see that we c a n interpret the second-order Comprehension Axiom in HA ! ; + G A C: This system is proof theoretically much stronger than HA (see, for instance, 20], Section 8.5), which implies that there cannot be any predicative w ay of modeling HA ! ; + G A C:
These remarks may explain a comment of G odel after presenting the negative interpretation 6]: \Intuitionism appears to introduce genuine restrictions only for analysis and set theory these restrictions, however, are due to the rejection, not of the principle of Excluded Middle, but of notions introduced by impredicative de nitions."
It can be shown that the negative i n terpretation extends to impredicative calculi, and by G odel's own interpretation of the Axiom of Choice by constructible sets, it is even possible to make sense in this way of the full higher-order arithmetic with the Excluded Middle and the Axiom of Choice in an \intuitionistic" impredicative higher-order arithmetic. (See the introductory note to 1933e in 6]).
An important aspect that is not covered in this comment h o wever is a more \intensional" aspect of logical systems, independent of their proof-theoretic strength. From an intuitionistic viewpoint, the proof object, that counts as evidence for the truth of a proposition, is of primary importance.
Problem in sequent calculus
Let us analyse now another way to get a possible computational content from classical arguments by considering Gentzen's sequent calculus formulation of classical arithmetic. One elegant approach is to use derivations in in nitary propositional logic 17, 21] . There is a general cut-elimination result for this logic which gives a computational interpretation of proofs. If we i n troduce countable disjunction and conjunction, we can interpret in this way classical quanti cation over natural numbers and give a computational interpretation of proofs in classical arithmetic.
A natural attempt is then to introduce disjunction and conjunction over the set of all number theoretic functions, and hope that we c a n i n terpret in this way classical quanti cation over number theoretic functions. However, as noticed in Tait's paper 21], there is a natural formulation of the Axiom of Choice in in nitary propositional logic. We start from atoms mn , mn and axioms ; mn mn and we ask whether it is possible to build a cut-free proof, uniformly in , o f 
from these axioms. It is not di cult to see that there cannot besuch a cut-free proof. We will explain this in some detail. 3 Assume by c o n tradiction is a cut-free proof of (1). First, observe that all conjunctions in (1) are countable, so by the subformula property all conjunctions in are countable, so that is at most countably branching. Since is also well founded, it follows that is countable and that at most countably many functions f 0 f 1 : : : appear in . 24] for an overview. A realizability interpretation interprets a logic, usually an extension of Heyting Arithmetic, in a programming language. More speci cally, t o e a c h f o r m ula of the logic is associated a type j j of the programming language. One then de nes by formula induction when a program of type j j realizes the formula : Intuitively, it means that this program is a constructive justi cation of the formula : To each proof of a closed formula is associated a program of type j j which realizes the formula .
The programming language P
The programming language P extends the types, terms and equations of HA ! with type constants for interpreting ? and equations, type constructors for lists and pairs, term constants associated to the new types, general recursion and in nite terms to form choice sequences.
3.2.1 Types of P The types of P are N Unit Abs and with 0 also ! 0 , 0 (cartesian product) and ] (lists over type ). The type Unit serves to interpret prime formulae, and the type Abs to interpret ?.
The type Abs will not be empty. Like in the case of HA ! , t ypes will be denoted by l o wer case greek letters 0 : : : . The types of HA ! will be called N-types.
Terms of P
The terms of P are built from (typed) variables and constants using lambda abstraction, (well typed) application, and the formation of in nite terms: if M 0 M 1 : : : is an in nite sequence of terms of type , then ( x:M x ) is a term of type N! . (The in nite terms are not for computational purposes, they only play a role in the termination proof.) There are countably many variables x y z : : : for each type . The set of constants of P extends that of HA ! with constants R for types that are not N-types, () : Unit, Dummy : Abs, Axiom 1 Axiom 2 : N!Abs, constants for general recursion ( xpoint combinators of all appropriate types) and constants for pairing and projection and list construction and destruction. Terms are again denoted by M M 0 N : : : , and M : expresses that the term M has type .
Equations of P
The only formulae of P are equations of the form M = M 0 , with M M 0 terms of P of the same type, not necessarily N.
Theory of P
The theory of P is equational, built up from the usual lambda calculus axioms and rules, de ning equations for the constants R as in HA ! , but now for all types of P, pairing axioms and list axioms and axioms for general recursion as usual, and the following axiom schema for in nite terms:
: : of type and natural numberk).
Pragmatics of P
We allow ourselves a liberal use of P. We will assume that all terms are well typed and we will reduce type information to a minimum that is required to reconstruct the type of a well typed term from the context. 3.2.6 Known facts about P There exists a reduction relation ;! on the terms of P such that the re exive, symmetric and transitive closure of ;! coincides with = (convertibility) on the terms of P. Moreover, ;! satises:
(i) the Church Rosser Theorem (ii) every closed normal form of type N is a numeral k (iii) every closed normal form of type Unit is () (iv) every closed normal form of type Abs is either Dummy 
Realizability
In this subsection a realizability interpretation of HA ! + G A C in P will begiven. It consists of a mapping of formulas of HA ! to types of P together with a realizability relation between programs in P and formulas of HA ! , where the program has the type to which the formula is mapped. The main result will be that every theorem of HA ! + G A C can berealized in P. The di cult step in proving this result is the realization of G A C.
3.3.1 Mapping formulas of HA ! to types of P
The idea behind this mapping is usually referred to as \forgetting dependencies", due to Martin-L of.
By formula induction we d e n e a t ype j j of P for every formula of HA ! : jM = M 0 j Unit j ? j Abs j ) j j j!j j j ^ j j j j j j8x : j !j j j9x : j j j Note that the domains of quanti cation in HA ! are types of HA ! , and hence of P, so that the mapping j j is well de ned. 3.3.2 Reducibility i n P In order to de ne the realizability relation we need a notion of reducibility for closed terms of P of 
Main Result and applications
In this subsection we formulate the main result, sketch a proof and give two applications of the main result. The essential and di cult step in the proof of the main result, the realization of G A C is given in the next subsection. where stands for a recursive call of the whole procedure described above. This informal discussion motivates the following recursive de nition: p h l = p (fun l x:rea l x ( x 0 :h x ( (y z): p h ((x y z) : l))))
We shall prove that, given H and P as above, P H ] realizes ?. Thus h p: p h ] realizes
The rst step will be, in the next lemma, to check that each recursive call to on a \good argument" indeed corresponds to an extension of the list L approximating a witness f such that 8x : N:: (x fx): By Fact (i) (Church Rosser Theorem) from 3.2.6 we g e t :(member k L). This is (ii) and completes the proof of the lemma. 2
Using the lemma above we can prove by contradiction that P H ] realizes ?. We give an informal argument, which can easily beformalized using the axiom of Dependent Choice and classical logic. The argument is similar to the argument used by n )x). It follows that P( n:Y 0 n n:Z 0 n ) realizes ? and hence reduces to a term of the form Axiom i k. By Fact (v) from 3.2.6, the Continuity Lemma, P( n:Y 0 n n:Z 0 n ) only depends on a nite initial subsequence of n:(n Y 0 n Z 0 n ). This con icts with the above construction of (X 1 Y 1 Z 1 ) : : : (X n Y n Z n )] for n large enough.
Comments on this interpretation
This interpretation gives a quite direct computational interpretation of the Axiom of Choice. For instance, it allows to interpret directly the rst informal proof of Higman's lemma presented in 16] , and avoids in this case the encoding of a function as a relation. Observe furthermore that the computation is demand-driven in the sense that the list of triples only contains function values and realizers that are really needed for the computation of a realizer of ?.
It should be noted also that our interpretation works for AC( 0 ) where = N but 0 is arbitrary. As it is given, it uses in an essential way the restriction = N, but we shall present below heuristic arguments that suggest a possible extension to higher types. The negative interpretation of this schema is subsumed by the following axiom schema G D C :
8n 8x r 9 y : (n x y)] ) r 9 f 8n : (n f(n) f (n + 1 ) ) :
We shall give a program that realizes this schema. Furthermore, we prove this fact not using classical logic and dependent choices, but intuitionistic meta-reasoning together with a certain strong principle of bar induction. This interpretation is based on the same idea of partial approximation of a function. An approximation of f satisfying 8n : (n f(n) f (n + 1)) will be given as a term u = ( n f n l ) where n is a numeral, f n a term of type and l a list of the form (0 a q 0 ) : : : (n ; 1 f n;1 q n;1 )] such that q i is of type j: (i f i f i+1 )j for i < n (with the convention that f 0 = a the xed object of typed ). It is now standard to rede ne fun and get such that fun u i is f i if i n and 0 if i > n and that get u i b is q i if i < n and b if n i:
If u = (n f n l ) is such an approximation, and f is of type and q of type j: (n f n f )j we write u + ( f q) for the approximation (n + 1 f (n f n q ) : l). We s a y t h a t v is a direct extension of u if v is of the form u + ( f q) for some f q and we denote this by u < v :
We de ne recursively, when u is of the form (n f n l ) P H u = P (fun u i:get u i ( x 0 : j j:H (n + 1 ) ( (y z): P H (u + ( y z))))):
It is then possible to show that h p: p h (0 a ]) realizes G D C , by a classical argument similar to the one we g a ve for the negative interpretation of the Axiom of Choice.
For an intuitionistic reduction to the principle of bar induction, we i n troduce 0 P H u = P (fun u i:get u i ( x 0 : j j:Axiom 1 i)):
As before, we can suppose that Axiom 1 does not occur in P nor in H:
We de ne a reducible approximation as an approximation (n f n l ) such that f n is a reducible term of type and l is a list (0 a q 0 ) : : : (n ; 1 f n;1 q n;1 )] such that f i is a reducible term of type and q i realizes : (i f i f i+1 ) for i < n with f 0 = a: Furthermore we a s k t h a t Axiom 1 does not appear neither in f n nor in l:
Note that, for each reducible approximation u the term 0 P H u realizes ? : Furthermore, by a reasoning similar to the one of the previous section, if 0 P H u does not reduce to a term of the form Axiom 1 n 0 then we h a ve P H u = 0 P H u a n d s o P H u realizes ? : A natural terminology is to say that the approximation u is partial if 0 P H u reduces to a term of the form Axiom 1 n 0 , and complete otherwise.
We claim that the set of complete approximations is a bar on the set of reducible approximations. This follows from the fact that any sequence of reducible approximations u 0 < u 1 < u 2 : : : is eventually complete. That is, there exists n 0 such that u n is complete if n 0 n: This is established using the Continuity Lemma as in the previous section.
It is now direct to prove b y bar induction that P H u realizes ? if u is a reducible approximation. If u < v implies that P H v realizes ? it follows indeed from the de nition of that P H u realizes ? :
5 Double Negation Shift This section will beinformal. We show that a slight variation of our interpretation gives also a computational interpretation of Spector's Double Negation Shift 18].
Exit operator
We rst add a new polymorphic constant to our programming language This notion of reduction may look incomplete. One may expect a rule saying how a term C Exit u] would reduce, where C ] is a term context. The rules su ce, however, to reduce closed proofs of atomic sentences, and it is possible to show that the Church-Rosser property still holds for this extended language.
The notion of realizability is changed by adding that Exit Unit (Axiom i n 0 ) realizes any atomic formula (even if this atomic formula is actually false) for any n umeral n 0 : It is direct to show that this schema plus the Axiom of Choice implies intuitionistically the negative interpretation of the Axiom of Choice.
Double Negation Shift
We de ne recursively P H l = P ( x:get x l (Exit (H x ( y: P H ((x y) : l))))) and then it is possible to show t h a t h p: p h ] realizes DNS, b y a reasoning quite similar as the one we did for the negative interpretation of the Axiom of Choice. 6 Comparison with Spector's work In
Here the type of n is N, the type of f is N! and the types of the other variables can easily be inferred. The problem is to nd closed terms yielding n z f when applied to a y d. This will be done by bar recursion.
Spector solved the system of functional equations arising from (2), i.e. 8a y d 9n z f n = yf^anz = f(yf)^z(anz) = df]
by rst reducing it to 8a y d 9f 8n yf 9z n anz n = f n z n f n = df]
and then solving (4) by bar recursion. Clearly (4) implies (3) by taking n = yf and z = z n . We i n troduce the following abbreviation (n f) n yf) 9 z n anz n = f n z n f n with m t h e l e n g t h o f t h e list l, which is an instance of the de nition schema of bar recursion (see 18] , 10]). Using it is easy to nd closed terms yielding n z f when applied to a y d, or in other words to solve ( 2 ) .
It is not obvious how to compare the bar recursive interpretation of DNS with the realization using the Exit operator. One of the super cial similarities seems to bethat the role of the Exit operator in the recursion is taken over by the condition y(fun l) m (m the length of l).
There is an important di erence in motivation between the work of Spector and ours. Spector's aim was to prove the consistency of analysis and to characterize its proof theoretic strength in terms of a subrecursive calculus. To this end, bar recursion suits well. Our aim is to explore the computational content of various choice axioms in combination with classical logic in order to extract algorithms from proofs. To this end, the Dialectica interpretation is rather indirect, and the realizability interpretation suits better.
Game Semantics
The purpose of this informal section is to explain how the program was found that realizes the negative i n terpretation of the Axiom of Choice. The importance of this section is that it may indicate a connection with the work on sequential algorithms, and may p a ve t h e w ay for a generalization to the case of the Axiom of Choice at higher-types, i.e. the axiom AC( 0 ) with 6 = N.
A semantics of classical arithmetic
The rst step is to give a n i n tuitive i n terpretation of cut-free provability a (Every formula is equivalent t o a n e x i s t e n tial formula by pre xing it with a singleton disjunction.) For instance, there is no winning strategy for the formulâ
because it is not possible to compute e ectively such a minimum value for a function f. The notion of classical validity, as described by Noviko 17] 
Game semantics and realizability
It is possible to represent 9loise's strategy by a program that realizes the negative i n terpretation of the formula 8k 9n k 8m k f(n) f(m), which i s 8k r 9 n k 8m k r f(n) f(m). We make the (inessential) simpli cation that k = 0 . Consider the following program: P n = P (n m h: if nm then (h ()) else ( P m)) where () is the only constant o f t ype Unit: It is possible to show that p: p 0 realizes the formula r 9n 8m r f(n) f(m). This program follows closely the previous strategy of 9loise, and the proof that p: p 0 realizes the formula r 9n 8m r f(n) f(m) is similar to the argument showing that this strategy is winning.
7.3 A strategy for the Axiom of Choice In 5] it was conjectured that it should be possible to extend this interpretation in the case of quanti cation over functions. The idea would be simply to allow as index set the set of all functions, and, apart from this single change, to keep the same notion of games and strategies. This suggested the realization of the Axiom of Choice given above.
There is an essential di culty, closely connected to the problem in sequent calculus mentioned above, that we cannot require the strategy for 9loise to win eventually against any p l a yer 8belard. In this way, w e can associate to this game a successive updating of the function f 0 f k = f 0 + m 0 7 ;! x 0 ] + m 1 7 ;! x 1 ] + : : : + m k 7 ;! x k ] where m j+1 is 8belard's answer to the move f = f j of 9loise.
The crucial point n o w i s t h a t 8belard loses as soon as we h a ve m k+1 = m j for some j k: If we assume that the player 8belard can only base his move on nitely many information from the move f = f k of 9loise, this will happen eventually, by a c o n tinuity argument.
Hence, if we change our notion of winning strategy in asking only that the player 9loise has to win eventually against any \ nite" player 8belard, this strategy is a winning strategy for the formula AC: The program that realizes the negative interpretation of the Axiom of Choice is a direct translation of this strategy. As in the arithmetical case, the proof of reducibility of this program closely follows the argument that such a strategy is \winning" against any \reasonable" player 8belard.
This argument is only yet heuristic and the main problem is making precise what is a \ -nite" player 8belard. We have seen that it would be wrong to ask that it wins against any, non-computable, strategy. But it is probably too restrictive to ask that it wins eventually against any computable strategy. One may try to de ne a winning strategy for 9loise as a strategy winning eventually against any continuous strategy for 8belard. We avoided here this di culty by formulating the interpretation in a functional system, but we can hope for a much more perspicuous analysis of the computation if it is expressed as an interaction between strategies.
Another possibility w ould be to use sequential algorithms for representing functions. To give a function will then not be an atomic operation, but the function will in general be given \piece by piece". One may then hope to avoid the consideration of continuity.
Conclusion
There are many directions in which this work can be improved and some potential connections that seem worthwhile to analyse.
One is the formulation of this work in the framework of sequential algorithms, which is indeed the natural framework in which one can observe \ i n tensional behaviour" of functionals, which has beenour main tool in the realization of the negative interpretation of the Axiom of Choice. We expect from such a formulation a much more transparent proof of termination (and it will be interesting to see what becomes in this formalism the di culty of nding \fresh" constants). We also think that in such a framework, the generalization to higher types, that is, a computational interpretation of AC( 0 ) for arbitrary and 0 , should be straightforward. An elegant f o r m w ould bean interpretation of the notion of dependent types in the framework of sequential algorithms, together with a direct interpretation of r and the inference of r 8 x : : (x) f r o m 8x : : r (x):
Closely related should be the question of a constructive formulation of our proof of realizability. Can we adapt the method of 2] and avoid the use of in nite terms? Our hope is that our interpretation, computationally more direct than the one of Spector 18, 10] , may provide help for a constructive understanding of classical analysis with the Axiom of Choice.
Experiments with some examples, in particular Higman's Lemma, have revealed a computational ine ciency of our interpretation. Intuitively, our algorithms proceed by trial and errors and may \forget too many things" of previous trials. It seems possible to design improved algorithms, that \remember" and can use all previous trials. This problem is closely connected to the problem of the computational interpretation of the implication r ) r ) r ( ^ ) so that its solution should have consequences even for the problem of the computational content of propositional classical logic.
The previous remark, and metaphors such as \trials and errors", \conjecturing laws that are re ned by experimentation", are immediately suggested by trying to understand the computational behaviour of our interpretation. They hint at possible connections with learning theories, such a s the one described in 19], where the learning agent m a y bene t from negative information.
Yet another natural connection is with the work of Hilbert 8, 9] and Ackermann 1] . Our interpretation can be seen as a variation of Hilbert's epsilon method 8, 9] , with a (classical) proof of termination. It will beinteresting to compare our algorithm with the one described in Ackermann's paper 1] 4 .
